ABSTRACT (Continue on rwersa if necessary and fdenm by bfock number)
Current procedures for health hazard assessment of weapons blast overpressure use criteria contained in MIL-STD-1474D. These criteria are applied to the test data so that the single pressure-time signature which indicates the greatest hazard (worst case round) is used to derive the recommended firing restrictions for the system. This approach is conservative and probably overrestricts the use of the system. Since it is based on the worst case round, the rest of the test data are essentially ignored in the hazard assessment.
A procedure to establish recommended firing limits using all of the data has been developed.
The procedure is based on accumulating hazards over the test data set until the criterion value is reached. This establishes the allowable number of rounds. A maximum exposure level for the worst case round is retained to prevent injury from single round exposures.
Two variations of the basic procedure are explored and numerical examples of each are presented.
The procedure implemented using a proportional dose accumulation is recommended.
is identified, the rest of the data are essentially ignored. For systems whose worst case levels are not beyond acceptable limits but lead to a recommended limit of only a small number of rounds, the use of the worst case analysis may be overly restrictive. For systems which exhibit considerable round-to-round variability, this can lead to severe restrictions on numbers of rounds allowed for training.
The worst case round is a statistically fickle quantity. Its statistical properties depend heavily on the number of rounds fired during test. The statistical problems with the small number of rounds per condition could be resolved by simply requiring more rounds per condition. If a large number of test rounds could be fued for each condition, more sophisticated and more stable statistical properties could be used in the HHA. However, the cost per round in testing is very high and a requirement of 20 to 30 rounds per condition would be exorbitant for the number of conditions which need to be evaluated. As a matter of practicality, firing a large number of rounds in a blast test is prohibited by cost. As a result, there is some effort expended to minimize the number of test rounds. One of the requirements in MILSTD-1474D is that the minimum number of test rounds fued per test condition is three or a number which is equal to the range of peak pressure levels in dB plus 1. This could lead to open-ended test plans since the number of rounds required is not known until after they have been fired. In practice, a typical test plan will call for five rounds under each firing condition. In effect, the gamble is that the range of peak levels will be less than 4 dB. The test to determine whether the number of rounds exceeds the range of levels is almost never applied since the data are not scored until long after the test data collection is complete. As a result, a typical set of test data consists of five rounds per firing condition, and five is a statistically small number. (The highest level in a sample of five defines a 97 percent confidence upper bound on the median level.) The use of this worst case round can lead to an overly conservative hazard assessment.
This report describes new HI-IA procedures which will require a minimal increase in the number of test rounds required, protect against excessive one round exposures, and utilize more of the test data to establish recommended firing restrictions when the single round exposures are not excessive. This proposal is intended to overcome the shortcomings of the worst case approach while maintaining reasonable protection against single round hazardous exposures. The essence of the procedure is to maximize the number of rounds available by lumping together all the conditions that are currently lumped, e.g., QE, AZ, temperature, etc. Then, the lumped data are rank ordered by their hazard indicator. The worst case round will be at the top of this list (the same round that would have determined the entire analysis under the current scheme). The hazard indicator for this round is compared to a limit criterion. If it exceeds the limit, there is potential for injury on a single round and the recommendation is that no firing be permitted. If it is below the limit, then an accumulation process begins. The rounds with the highest and second highest hazard indicators are cumulated together and compared to the limit criterion. This accumulation is continued until the accumulated hazard indicators exceed the limit criterion or until all the data are used. If the limit is exceeded before the rank ordered list is exhausted, the ANR is the maximum ordered round number for which the accumulated hazard indicator does not exceed the limit. If all rounds on the list are exhausted and the limit has not been reached, the accumulation continues by starting at the top of the list again and continuing this iteration until the limit is reached. The ANR then becomes the total number of rounds in the accumulation process before the limit is exceeded.
In order to assure enough data are available, it will be necessary to require at least five rounds per test condition as has become common practice. If there are enough test conditions for which the data can be lumped for the total number of test rounds to be 25 or more, then the number of rounds per condition can be five. Otherwise, the number of rounds per condition will have to be increased so that the total number of rounds from conditions that can be combined is greater than 25. (This requirement should add very few test rounds to a typical weapon system test.)
There are two alternatives for the accumulation process. The first involves a proportional dose accumulation. This method assumes an established procedure such as ML-STD-1474D for calculating ANR for any given pressure-time signature. For each test round, the ANR for that impulse is calculated using conventional procedures. This becomes the denominator in a fraction, l/AN&, for i=l to N. This fraction becomes the proportional dose hazard indicator for that round. These hazard indicators are rank ordered from largest to smallest across all test rounds which can be lumped together. The accumulation process is a simple sum of the rank ordered fractional doses to produce the accumulated proportional dose hazard indicator (APDHI):
11 APDHI=x l/ANR, fori= 1 tok The limit criterion is 1 .O. The largest k which keeps APDHI less than 1 .O becomes the system ANR. The ANR, used in the first term of the APDHI would have been the system limitation under current procedures. If ANR, is greater than 1, then there could be two or more rounds permitted under the proposed scheme. Since the fractions l/AN& are a decreasing series, they will not add to more than 1.0 before ANR, of them have been cumulated. Thus, the proposed procedure using APDHI will always result in the same number or a larger number of rounds than the worst case round procedure.
The MLSTD-1474D currently limits exposure to the "Z-curve" which permits five rounds per day with single hearing protection. This limit can be maintained using this new procedure by setting the limit for the worst case round so that l/ANR, must be less than 0.2. After this initial condition is met, the accumulation process would be done as described. The proposed procedure will still result in at least five rounds per day for the system if the worst case round is below the Z-curve. 3 recommended firing limit using the APDHI method. Finally, appendix A, Example 2 was taken from the M4A2, zone 7 data from the same howitzer. The round-byround data are contained in appendix B, table B-l. The data included three QEs and two AZs. The complete set of M4A2 data included conditions in which the round-to-round variability was high due to secondary detonations near the muzzle (flashers). The left traverse data and the center traverse data were combined to produce the largest set of data which could be used to assess the M4A2 charge. Table 1 summarizes the ANR derived by the four procedures. Table B -2 shows the rank ordered ANR and APDHI for the full set of M4A2 data. Only one cycle of accumulation is shown since the ANR based on APDHI can be easily derived from one cycle of the APDHI from all the data. The APDHI for position 1 was only 0.1837 after all 34 rounds had been used in the accumulation. Thus, it would require five complete repetitions of the accumulation through the data set to reach 0.9185. Adding the first round to this would bring the accumulation to 0.9834. But adding the first two rounds would make the total 1.0227. So the ANR for position 1 is 171 (5*34+1). For position 2, the accumulated total for all 33 rounds was 0.2228. After four complete cycles, this total was 0.8912. Adding the first round to this would yield 1.0159. Thus, the ANR for position 2 was 132 (4*33+0). Table B -3 shows the rank ordered III and AHI. Unlike the APDHI, AHI is a nonlinear accumulation and, therefore, the sequential accumulation passes though the data set are shown until the AHI reaches its limit of 177 dB. This example shows a peculiar property of the AHI which was not seen in the M203Al data. It increased over the first three rounds in the accumulation process (these were the highest levels), and then decreased or remained constant for the next seven rounds at position 1 and 17 rounds for position 2 before it began a slow increase toward the limit. The AH1 finally reached the limit on the 281st round for position 1 and the 277th round for position 2. Position 2 then established the ANR.
Example 3 was based on the same data from the M4A2, zone 7, used in example 2. The rounds which had the secondary explosions were removed from the data set to produce a data set which is more typical of a well-behaved system. The round-by-round data are contained in appendix C, table C-l. The table in the text (M4A2, nonflash) summarizes the ANR derived by the four procedures. Table C The use of the worst case round to calculate the ANR for hazard assessment is a relatively conservative approach. It protects against the possibility that an exposure could consist entirely of rounds at the same level as the worst round in the test data. It is a highly unlikely event. This conservatism comes at the price of severe restrictions on firing which are probably not warranted. In the examples shown here, the M4A2 would be restricted almost as much as the M203Al based on the worst case round (ANR=8 vs. 5). Yet, the M203Al was consistently high level while the M4A2 was only occasionally high level. The use of average peak level and B-duration would greatly increase the ANR for the M4A2, but provides no protection against an occasional unacceptable round.
The APDHI is a rational alternative which does have a built in protection against the occasional unacceptable round. However, it allows the distribution of levels to be used in determining the ANR. It is an intermediate step between the averaging process and the worst case process. It has the property that each test round contributes an increment of indicated hazard based on the level of that test round. It ensures that when the ANR exceeds the number of test rounds, the higher level rounds are factored into the ANR calculation in proportion to their incidence in the set of test data, without making assumptions about the statistical distributions of the test data.
The AHI procedure has some of the advantages of the APDHI. However, the declining values of the AHI when there are a few high level rounds in the data set is a negative feature which cannot occur with the APDHI. It appears to result from the effect of the Flog(N) correction for the number-intensity trading rule. When N is small and the incremental contribution from the low level rounds is relatively small, the decrement from subtracting Slog(N) overwhelms the energy contributions of the low level rounds. If the number-intensity trading rule were lOlog( this decrement would not occur.
When we compare the ANR from the APDHI with the AI-II, we find they yield similar results when the data are relatively uniform (M203Al and the non-flash M4A2). When the data have the small number of high levels in the data set, there is a large difference between the ANR established by the two procedures. Both procedures result in substantially larger ANR than the worst case analysis.
Concm
Two alternative procedures for using test data to establish recommended firing restrictions as part of the I-II-IA process have been described. Of these, the accumulated proportional dose hazard indicator has greater face validity. It gives a monotonically increasing indication of hazard across the test data. It is conceptually consistent with the current procedures for estimating hazard when different charges are combined in a firing sequence. Table. HI and AH1 from M203Al data rank ordered by descending HI. Table. ANR, l/ANR, and APDHI calculated from the M4A2 data rank ordered for increasing ANR. 
